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Creativity is primarily investigated within the neuroscientific perspective as a unitary
construct. While such an approach is beneficial when trying to infer the general picture
regarding creativity and brain function, it is insufficient if the objective is to uncover
the information processing brain mechanisms by which creativity occurs. As creative
thinking emerges through the dynamic interplay between several cognitive processes,
assessing the neural correlates of these operations would enable the development and
characterization of an information processing framework from which to better understand
this complex ability. This article focuses on two aspects of creative cognition that are
central to generating original ideas. “Conceptual expansion” refers to the ability to widen
one’s conceptual structures to include unusual or novel associations, while “overcoming
knowledge constraints” refers to our ability to override the constraining influence
imposed by salient or pertinent knowledge when trying to be creative. Neuroimaging
and neuropsychological evidence is presented to illustrate how semantic processing and
cognitive control networks in the brain differentially modulate these critical facets of
creative cognition.
Keywords: creative cognition, divergent thinking, semantic cognition, cognitive control, inhibitory control, fronto-
striatal network, fronto-parietal network
The interest in uncovering the brain mechanisms underlying
creative thinking, or the ability to generate original yet relevant
responses in a given context (Stein, 1953), has a lengthy scientific
history that dates back at least to the 1940s (Reitman, 1947; Ashby
and Bassett, 1949). The most influential issues that have guided
investigations on creativity and brain function include enhanced
creative ability following brain damage (Miller and Miller, 2013),
the dominance of right over left hemisphere function in creative
thinking (Mihov et al., 2010), and the brain basis of exceptional
ability among experts in creative domains such as music, art
and dance (Bengtsson et al., 2007). The general (although not
necessarily unanimous) picture that emerges from the literature is
that creative performance and/or ability is particularly associated
with frontal lobe (FL) function (Dietrich and Kanso, 2010),
higher right brain activity (Mihov et al., 2010), greater EEG alpha
power which reflects high internal processing demands (Fink and
Benedek, 2012), and that it can be inadvertently boosted as a
consequence of specific types of brain damage (Seeley et al., 2008).
Such generalizations regarding creativity and brain function
primarily arise from adopting a somewhat unitary approach
in investigating creativity where it is assessed as an undiffer-
entiated general construct, as opposed to process-differentiated
one. This is customarily achieved by contrasting brain activity
(neuroimaging or EEG studies) or behavioral performance (neu-
ropsychological studies) during creative vs. non-creative tasks.
Several researchers have critically addressed theoretical and
methodological concerns that arise in the context of neurosci-
entific investigations of creative thinking, such as the inability to
prompt creativity in a reliable or valid manner and the suboptimal
nature of comparison tasks in creativity paradigms (Dietrich,
2007; Arden et al., 2010; Sawyer, 2011; Abraham, 2013). The
advantage of a unitary approach is that it delivers the “big picture”
regarding our creative brains. However, the unitary approach is
too generalized, and hence insufficient, if the overarching aim is
to uncover the neural and information processing mechanisms
by which creativity occurs. As several cognitive operations work
in unison when we are engaged in creative idea generation,
adopting a “process” approach to creativity (Kozbelt et al., 2010)
in investigating the brain correlates of these different operations
would allow us to realize such an objective.
COGNITIVE COMPONENTS OF CREATIVITY
The Geneplore model of creativity (Ward et al., 1995; Finke et al.,
1996; Ward et al., 1997), which sought to characterize the different
mental operations that are involved during creative thinking, was
driven by the process approach. Although diverse in nature, these
operations were proposed to have two components in common.
First, they involve the generation of potential ideas or “preinven-
tive” structures (e.g., the analogical transfer of information from
one domain to another). Second, this initial generation phase is
followed by extensive exploration of these preinventive structures
(e.g., search for conceptual limitations).
According to this model, the essential difference between
creative and “non-creative” or normative cognition does not lie
in the type of mental operations themselves, but in the contexts
to which these information processing toolboxes are applied
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(Abraham, in press). The contexts or problem solving situations
that prompt creative cognition (e.g., compose a haiku) are
relatively more open-ended, ambiguous, non-linear, abstract
and unpredictable compared to those that primarily necessitate
normative cognition (e.g., devise a weekly exercise regime). Cre-
ative cognition can therefore be assessed by examining normative
cognitive processes under explicitly generative conditions. In
fact, a number of such mental operations have been described
(Figure 1; Abraham and Windmann, 2007). These include the
ability to broaden the framework of established conceptual
structures (conceptual expansion), mental visualization during
creative idea generation (creative imagery), the ability to surpass
the constraining influence of recently activated knowledge
(overcoming knowledge constraints), and the sudden occurrence
of a solution during problem solving as a result of a fundamental
perspective shift (insight). So, how do these operations work in
combination with one another during creative idea generation?
Imagine the following scenario. You are asked to imagine
new uses for a shoe, beyond the object’s customary use of foot
protection. Allow yourself a few minutes to carry out this task
before reading further and make note of the uses you generate.
Typically, other common uses for a shoe, such as using it to
kill a cockroach, will occur to you automatically. As these familiar
options are quickly exhausted, the task becomes increasingly
cognitively demanding. While trying to come up with novel ideas,
you probably generated mental images to explore a shoe’s physical
parameters in terms of weight, volume, dimensions, materials,
type: stilettos vs. sneakers, and so on (creative imagery). During
this process, it may have become apparent to you that a shoe can
be used as a make-shift container (conceptual expansion) and
that the brutally angled sole of a stiletto lends itself to different
uses than the flat sole of a sneaker. While exploring potential uses
for a shoe as a highly angled container in the case of a stiletto,
you may inadvertently recollect uses that are closely related to
those you have already generated, such as using the stiletto’s heel
to impale a spider, and you strive to inhibit this tendency to
rehash known associations (overcoming knowledge constraints).
Then, seemingly out of the blue, the different elements that are
being explored suddenly come together in a novel manner while
you undergo some form of an “aha-experience” (insight) as you
become aware of this new use of, for instance, using a shoe as a
hamster slide (Figure 1).1
The focus in the present opinion article will be limited to eval-
uating the similarities and differences in brain function that are
associated with conceptual expansion and overcoming knowledge
constraints as these operations have received little to no attention
thus far within the literature, unlike the processes of insight
(Kounios and Beeman, 2009; Dietrich and Kanso, 2010) and
imagery (Farah, 1989; LeBoutillier and Marks, 2003; Bartolomeo,
2008).
1This example is only presented for illustrative purposes to showcase differ-
ences between select cognitive operations during the creative act. As such,
it not to be construed as a prototype that represents the manner in which
the creative process typically unfolds. The list of selected operations is by no
means exhaustive. Moreover, the occurrence, temporal order and interrelation
between these operations would be expected to differ as a function of intrain-
dividual, interindividual and contextual factors.
CONCEPTUAL EXPANSION
The ability to expand acquired conceptual structures to include
novel elements is investigated in tasks that assess conceptual
expansion (Ward, 1994). The original task involved having partic-
ipants generate animals that lived on another planet that was very
different from Earth. How far these alien creatures deviated from
generic Earth animals in terms of the absence of typical features
and the presence of atypical features was assessed. As this animal
task cannot be optimally implemented in its original form for
neuroimaging research, three alternative experimental paradigms
were developed to assess conceptual expansion. These have now
been implemented in fMRI (Abraham et al., 2012b; Kröger et al.,
2012; Rutter et al., 2012b) and EEG settings (Rutter et al., 2012a;
Kröger et al., 2013).
The paradigms were devised with the objective of uncover-
ing the brain correlates of conceptual expansion. Brain regions
that were commonly activated across all three paradigms would
be considered to be reliably involved in creative conceptual
expansion. Two approaches were adopted when developing these
paradigms2 where one was devised to assess “active” concep-
tual expansion (Abraham et al., 2012b) while the other assessed
“passive” conceptual expansion (Kröger et al., 2012; Rutter
et al., 2012b). Participants shouldered the task of expanding the
concepts themselves (generate novel uses for a newspaper) in the
volitionally generated or active conceptual expansion paradigm.
In contrast, during the involuntarily induced or passive con-
ceptual expansion paradigms, participants were presented with
object-use combinations (Shoe→ Plant pot) or metaphors (The
clouds danced over the city), to which they reported experiences
of conceptual expansion. This occurred when they encountered
an object-use combination or metaphor that was deemed by them
to be both novel (previously unknown to them) and appropriate.
The brain regions that were found to be activated across all
three paradigms were limited to the left hemisphere and included
the anterior inferior frontal gyrus (IFG: BA 45/47), the temporal
pole (TP: BA 38) and the lateral frontopolar cortex (FPC: BA
10). The IFG is central to semantic information processing in the
brain (Bookheimer, 2002; Binder and Desai, 2011; Jefferies, 2013)
with anterior aspects of this structure being involved in semantic
selection and controlled semantic retrieval (Thompson-Schill,
2003; Badre and Wagner, 2007). The TP is also key structure of
relevance in semantic cognition as it is widely held to underlie the
domain-general or amodal repositories of conceptual knowledge
of the brain (Lambon Ralph et al., 2009; Simmons and Martin,
2009). It is involved in the combination and integration of lexical
representations to a context (Lau et al., 2008), as well as in the
acquisition of new conceptual knowledge (Hoffman et al., 2014).
2The alternate uses task is widely employed in investigations of creativity
where divergent thinking is assessed in terms of fluency or originality of the
responses. Just as in studies of other facets of cognition, the same task can be
implemented in different ways depending on the microlevel of study to allow
for specific inferences to be made regarding creative function. Within the neu-
rocognitive approach, the microlevel is centered on the brain correlates of the
cognitive process. So the brain response when performing the alternate uses
task is assessed relative to brain response when performing a closely matched
control task that does not necessitate conceptual expansion, but nonetheless
requires reasoning, fluency, semantic judgments, cognitive control, and so on.
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FIGURE 1 | A schematic diagram to highlight four of the several different mental operations that are involved in creative thinking with a hypothetical
example of how different aspects of creative cognition work in unison during creative idea generation.
The lateral FPC, in contrast, is held to mediate cognitive con-
trol at the most abstract level of information processing (Badre,
2008; Christoff et al., 2009) and plays a key role during relational
reasoning (Christoff et al., 2001; Wendelken et al., 2008) as well
as when combining information from two or more separate
cognitive operations (Ramnani and Owen, 2004). Although the
lateral FPC is not specifically limited to semantic aspects of
information processing, both this brain region and the anterior
IFG are sensitive to the degree of associative strength between
concepts (Bunge et al., 2005; Green et al., 2010) with greater brain
activity elicited by wider semantic distances.
To summarize, neuroimaging studies on conceptual expansion
have revealed that brain structures (inferior frontal, temporopolar
and frontopolar) that are collectively associated with the selection,
controlled retrieval, combination and integration of semantic
knowledge are preferentially more strongly engaged during cre-
ative conceptual expansion relative to other types of normative
semantic information processing. Although nonverbal conceptual
expansion has yet to be investigated in the same manner, the same
brain network would be expected to be involved in conceptual
expansion regardless of the stimulus type. This is because the use
of verbal and non-verbal as well as semantic and non-semantic
control tasks across the different paradigms revealed that the
engagement of this network of brain regions during conceptual
expansion cannot be merely attributed to verbal or semantic
processing.
OVERCOMING KNOWLEDGE CONSTRAINTS
The ability to override the hindering influence imposed by rele-
vant but distracting information during creative idea generation
(Smith et al., 1993) is referred to here as the process of overcoming
knowledge constraints. In the original toy task that was devised
to assess this operation, participants are asked to imagine and
draw a novel toy that does not yet exist (previously/currently).
But before they do so, they are shown examples of three novel toys
that were generated by others. Unbeknownst to the participants,
these novel toy examples were in actuality engineered by the
experimenter to have three features in common. What is assessed
after the participants generate their own responses is how many
of these three elements are present in the participants’ toy inven-
tions. Higher scores reflect stronger incorporation of example
elements, which in turn reflects a poorer ability to overcome
knowledge constraints that were levied by a salient and distracting
context.
Just as in the conceptual expansion task, the toy task cannot
be optimally implemented in its original form for neuroimaging
research. To date, no study has directly investigated the brain
correlates of overcoming knowledge constraints during creative
idea generation. Only two neuroimaging studies have an indirect
bearing on this discussion where the opposite effect, of “cognitive
stimulation” on creative problem solving upon being exposed to
others’ ideas, was assessed (Fink et al., 2010, 2012).
The behavioral findings indicated that prior exposure to com-
mon uses (generated by others) relative to no prior exposure,
led to greater originality in self-generated uses. But this was not
true with prior exposure to original uses. As Fink et al. (2012)
did not assess the degree of similarity between self-generated vs.
other-generated uses, it is not possible to speculate about how
these two situations may have involved overcoming different types
of knowledge constraints. When comparing the brain’s response
during idea generation following original-use-prior-exposure
compared to no-prior-exposure or common-use-prior-exposure,
heightened activity was found in the left posterior middle tempo-
ral gyrus (MTG). The posterior MTG is part of the brain’s seman-
tic system (Binder and Desai, 2011) and is held to underlie the
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“long-term storage of and access to information associated with
lexical representations” which “serves as input to higher-order
semantic processes” (Lau et al., 2008). If we were to presume that
prior exposure to original ideas imposes more constraints on idea
generation than no prior exposure to ideas, as has been suggested
by behavioral research, one could postulate that posterior middle
temporal regions are more actively recruited when having to
overcome knowledge constraints.
Interestingly, neuropsychological evidence has demonstrated
that damage to lateral parietal and temporal cortices (includ-
ing the posterior MTG) is associated with poorer performance
on the overcoming knowledge constraints toy task (Abraham
et al., 2012a). Creative cognition was assessed in three neu-
rological samples with lesions of the FL, basal ganglia (BG),
or parietal-temporal lobe (PTL). The PTL group were signif-
icantly less adept at overcoming knowledge constraints, which
is a pattern that fits with findings of semantic persevera-
tive responses associated with this population, especially in
the presence of semantic distractions (e.g., Corbett et al.,
2011).
The BG and FL-POL (FL group with frontopolar/frontoorbital
lesions) groups though were found to be better at overcoming
knowledge constraints during creative idea generation compared
to healthy control groups. This information processing advantage
was very specific in that neither the BG group nor the FL-POL
group displayed superior performance on any other aspect of
creative cognition.
The BG together with the prefrontal cortex are part of
the network in the brain that orchestrates executive function
and cognitive control (Alexander et al., 1991; Robbins, 2007;
Brocki et al., 2008). Within the prefrontal cortex, frontopo-
lar regions underlie abstract cognitive control (Badre, 2008;
Badre et al., 2009) while frontoorbital regions are associated
with cognitive disinhibition (Cummings, 1993). BG lesions are
accompanied by poor inhibitory control, marked inattention
and increased distractibility (Fielding et al., 2006; Aron et al.,
2007).
These factors would be advantageous in overcoming knowl-
edge constraints as optimal performance on this task requires
inhibiting salient information that is engineered such that
increased effort must be expended to see past it. Having poor
inhibitory control or being easily distractible would render one
more capable of overcoming such constraints as one’s attention is
continually being involuntarily diverted away from any particular
focus.
Further indirect support from this idea comes from a study
on creative cognition in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) where adolescents with ADHD outperformed healthy
matched control participants on the toy task (Abraham et al.,
2006). Even within a sample of adults with chronic schizophrenia,
a high degree of thought disorder symptoms (disorganization
within the semantic content of thought) was associated with
superior ability to overcome knowledge constraints on the toy task
(Abraham et al., 2007). Indeed, both ADHD and schizophrenia
are associated with dysfunctions of the fronto-striatal network in
the brain (Robbins, 1990; Bradshaw and Sheppard, 2000; Robbins
et al., 2012).
CREATIVE COGNITION AND THE BRAIN
The general picture that glimmers through when bringing
together the findings from neuroscientific investigations of con-
ceptual expansion and overcoming knowledge constraints during
creative idea generation is that of a dynamic interplay between
semantic processing and cognitive control networks in the brain.
Trying to conceive of an original idea necessarily involves
broadening or expanding existing conceptual structures to
include novel or previously unassociated features. When engaged
in conceptual expansion, the brain’s semantic processing network
operates on overdrive, particularly the higher-order regions which
mediate lexical selection, controlled retrieval, combination and
integration processes. During this process of cogitation, when
distracting but salient information threatens to throw a spanner
in the works by hampering one’s ability to generate truly original
ideas, the cognitive control network of the brain storms into play
to push these distractions out of one’s mind. This can be done
in one of two ways—by either inhibiting or ignoring this salient
information.
Inhibiting or ignoring salient task-relevant information is in
fact very difficult as our predictive brains are developed to be
especially adept at efficient and effective goal-directed action
(Bubic et al., 2010) and we are accustomed to operating in our
daily lives within normative contexts where the distractions one
may have to overcome can be unmistakably recognized and are
not necessarily salient or relevant to the specific task at hand.
Such distractions can therefore be (relatively speaking) easily
ignored. During creative idea generation though, the distracting
information can be exceedingly pertinent to the task at hand and
cannot therefore go unheeded in the same manner. Under such
conditions, imbalances within the fronto-striatal network seem to
confer specific advantages in creative cognition, possibly owing
to the manifestation of cognitive disinhibition and increased
distractibility, which would allow for a greater ease in disregarding
salient semantic distractors.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this article was to outline the potential
neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie two vital aspects of cre-
ative cognition—conceptual expansion and overcoming knowl-
edge constraints—based on neuroscientific findings that adopted
a process approach to investigate the same. What was highlighted
was the role of the semantic processing and cognitive control net-
works in the brain during creative idea generation. These insights
can help inform and guide future neuroscientific investigations
on creativity as well as aid in the development of more detailed
and targeted information processing models of creative neurocog-
nition. Promising future directions for exploration include the
impact of training-induced plasticity effects on different aspects
of creative neurocognition as well as uncovering the association
between information processing biases in creative cognition with
reference to variability that is manifest in real world creativity.
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